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HEISENBERG GROUPS AS PLATFORM FOR THE AAG
KEY-EXCHANGE PROTOCOL
DELARAM KAHROBAEI, HA T. LAM
Abstract. Garber, Kahrobaei, and Lam studied polycyclic groups generated
by number field as platform for the AAG key-exchange protocol. In this paper,
we discuss the use of a different kind of polycyclic groups, Heisenberg groups,
as a platform group for AAG by submitting Heisenberg groups to one of AAG’s
major attacks, the length-based attack.
After the introduction of the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld (AAG) key-exchange pro-
tocol in 1999 [1], it has been studied extensively with different groups as platform,
for example, using braid groups by Ko et al. [17], using Thompson’s group by
Shpilrain and Ushakov [23]. Different attack methods have also been applied to
AAG [18, 12, 21].
One of the major attack methods of the AAG protocol is the length-based attack
(LBA), originated with Hughes and Tannenbaum [14], whose paper provided an
example in braid groups, together with remark on the importance of the length
function. Garber et al. studied the infeasibility of the length based attack with
a choice of length function [11], but then introduced a variant of it using memory
which succeeded in breaking AAG for braid group [10]. Myasnikov and Ushakov
also studied the length-based attack for braid group and provided several variants
with which it was possible to break AAG [20]. Similar attack was implemented
against system based on the Thompson group [22]
In 2004, Eick and Kahrobaei suggested using polycyclic groups as platform
group for the AAG key-exchange protocol [4]. This idea was realized by Garber,
Kahrobaei, and Lam [9]. In that paper, several variants of LBA were tested on an
AAG implementation using polycyclic groups generated from number field. The
result suggests that this type of polycyclic group is resistant to the length-based
attack. Taking inspiration from this, we want to study the Heisenberg group as
platform group for AAG. We use the variants of the length-based attack presented
in [9] to conduct tests on an implementation of the Heisenberg group. The result is
then analysed, and we conclude that the Heisenberg groups can be used as platform
for the AAG protocol given the correct parameters.
Furthermore, the conjugacy search problem has been used for several other cryp-
tographic protocols, such as the non-commutative Diffie-Hellman key exchange [17],
the non-commutative El-Gamal key exchange [15], the non-abelian Cramer-Shoup
key exchange [2] and the non-commutative digital signatures [16]. The length-
based attack can be applied to all of these protocols, hence testing different groups
against it and collecting data about parameters that make them resistant to LBA
is important, not just for the implementation of AAG but also of other protocols.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 1, we introduce the Anshel-Anshel-
Goldfeld key exchange protocol, in Section 2, there is a short review of polycyclic
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groups and the construction of Heisenberg group; in Section 3, we talk about the
length-based attack; and in Section 4, we detail the experiments, results and con-
clusion that we made.
1. The Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld Key Exchange Protocol and
Heisenberg Group
In this section, we give a short introduction to the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld key-
exchange protocol. As usual, we use Alice and Bob as two parties who want to
communicate over an insecure channel. The Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld key exchange
protocol works as follows:
Let G = 〈g1, . . . , gn | R〉 be a finitely presented group with generators g1, . . . , gn
and relation set R. First, Alice chooses, as her public set, a = (a1, . . . , aN1) where
ai ∈ G and Bob chooses, as his public set, b = (b1, . . . , bN2) where bi ∈ G. They
both publish their sets. Alice then chooses her private key A = aε1s1 . . . a
εL
sL
where
asi ∈ a and εi ∈ {±1}. Bob also chooses his private key B = b
δ1
t1
. . . bδLtL where
bti ∈ b and δi ∈ {±1}. Alice computes b
′
i = A
−1biA for all bi ∈ b and sends it to
Bob. Bob also computes a′i = B
−1aiB for all ai ∈ a and sends it to Alice. Now the
shared secret key is K = A−1B−1AB. Alice can computes this key by
KA = A
−1a′ε1s1 · · ·a
′εL
sL
= A−1(B−1as1B)
ε1 · · · (B−1asLB)
εL
= A−1B−1aε1s1 · · · a
εL
sL
B = A−1B−1AB = K
Bob can likewise computes KB = B
−1b′δ1t1 · · · b
′δL
tL
= B−1A−1BA, hence the shared
key is K = K−1B .
In order to find K, the eaves-dropper needs to find either A′ ∈ 〈a1, . . . , aN1〉 such
that b′ = A′−1bA′ or find B′ ∈ 〈b1, . . . , bN2〉 such that a
′ = B′−1aB′. Thus, the
security of AAG is based on the assumption that the subgroup-restricted simulta-
neous conjugacy search problem is hard.
2. Polycyclic Groups
In this section, we give a short review of polycyclic groups and discuss how we
generate Heisenberg groups.
2.1. Polycyclic groups. Recall that G is a polycyclic group if it has a polycyclic
series, i.e., a subnormal series G = G1 ⊲ G2 ⊲ . . . ⊲ Gn+1 = {1} with non-trivial
cyclic factors. The polycyclic generating sequence of G is the n-tuple (g1, . . . , gn)
such that Gi = 〈gi, Gi+1〉 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Every polycyclic group has a finite presentation of the form:
〈g1, . . . , gn | g
gi
j = wij , g
g
−1
i
j = vij , g
rk
k = ukk for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n and k ∈ I〉
where wij , vij , ukk are words in the generators gi+1, . . . , gn and I is the set of i ∈
{1, . . . , n} such that ri = [Gi : Gi+1] is finite. Here a
b stands for b−1ab.
Using induction, we see that each element of G defined by this presentation can
be uniquely written as g = ge11 . . . g
en
n with ei ∈ Z for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and 0 ≤ ei < ri for
i ∈ I. This is the normal form of an element. If every element in the group can be
presented uniquely in normal form, then the polycyclic presentation is consistent.
Note that every polycyclic group has a consistent polycyclic presentation. Thanks
to the existence of normal form, the word problem in polycyclic groups can be
solved efficiently, this is an important requirement of a platform group for AAG.
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The Hirsch length of a polycyclic group is the number of i such that ri = [Gi :
Gi+1] is infinite. This number is invariant of the chosen polycyclic sequence.
For more details regarding polycyclic groups, see [13, 6].
2.2. Heisenberg groups. Heisenberg groups have been studied widely from the
point of view of analysis, geometry, physics, etc [3]. From the group theory point
of view, they are often used as examples of nilpotent groups. For more discussion
of Heisenberg groups and their group-theoretic properties, see [7].
The three dimensional Heisenberg group, often known as the Heisenberg group,
is the group of 3× 3 upper triangular matrices of the form

1 x y
0 1 z
0 0 1


where x, y, z ∈ R. Another presentation for it is 〈a, b, c | [a, b] = c, [a, c] = [b, c] = 1〉.
The nilpotency for the Heisenberg group is easy to see, making it a polycyclic group.
Generalizing the Heisenberg group, we have higher dimension Heisenberg groups,
H2n+1, n ≥ 1, n ∈ Z. As matrix group, they are groups of dimension n+2 matrices
of the form 

1 x1 . . . xn c
0 1 0 . . . yn
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 . . . 1 y1
0 0 . . . 0 1


where xi, yi, z ∈ R. The calculation for the commutator subgroup and the center
of H2n+1 is straight-forward, showing that it is also a nilpotent group, thus, also
polycyclic. The Hirsch length of H2n+1 is 2n+ 1.
The Heisenberg groups of higher dimension H2n+1 also has presentation
〈a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn, c | [ai, bi] = c, [ai, c] = [bi, c] = 1, [ai, aj ] = [bi, bj ] = 1, i 6= j〉
This presentation makes it easy to encode H2n+1 in a computer system. In fact,
the GAP (Groups, Algorithms, Programming) system [8] can compute H2n+1 as
part of the polycyclic package by Eick and Nickel [5]. Using this implementation
of H2n+1, we study the Heisenberg groups as platform group for the AAG key-
exchange protocol, in particular, under the length-based attack, one of the major
attacks for AAG.
3. Length Based Attack
3.1. Overview of the length-based attack. The length-based attack is a prob-
abilistic attack against AAG, with the goal of finding Alice’s (or Bob’s) private key.
It is based on the idea that a conjugation of the right element will decrease the
length of the captured package. Using notation of Section 1, the captured package
is b′ = (b′1, . . . , b
′
N2
) where b′i = A
−1biA. If we conjugate b′ with elements from the
group 〈a1, . . . , aN1〉 and the resulting tuple has decreased length, then we know we
have found a conjugating factor. The process of conjugation is then repeated with
the decreased length tuple until another conjugating factor is found. The process
ends when the conjugated captured package is the same as b = (b1, . . . , bN2), which
is public knowledge. Then the conjugate can be recovered by reversing the sequence
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of conjugating factors. The idea of the length-based attack can be summarized as
going from bottom to top of the tower:
bi
↓
a−ε1s1 bia
ε1
s1
↓
a−ε2s2 a
−ε1
s1
bia
ε1
s1
aε2s2
↓
...
↓
a−εLsL . . . a
−ε2
s2
a−ε1s1 bia
ε1
s1
aε2s2 . . . a
εL
sL
For more details on the length-based attack, see [19, 20].
3.2. LBA with memory 2. In [11, 10, 20, 22, 9], several variations of the length-
based attack are given. Here we recall Algorithm 4 of [9] which we use in our
experiments.
In this algorithm, S holds M tuples every round and all elements of S are
conjugated, but only the M smallest conjugated tuples (by total length) are added
back into S. Because we are adding backM smallest tuples and not just one single
element, we avoid the problem of the same element being removed and added time
and again. Moreover, this method of saving several tuples, not just the ones whose
length decreased after conjugation, keeps us away from problems generated by
peaks. Here, for the stopping condition, we use a time-out that is defined by the
user.
Algorithm 1 LBA with Memory 2
1: Initialize S = {(|b′|, b′, idG)}.
2: while not time out do
3: for (|c|, c, x) ∈ S do
4: Remove (|c|, c, x) from S
5: Compute ca
ε
i for all i ∈ {1 . . .N1} and ε = ±1
6: if ca
ε
i = b then output inverse of xaεi and stop
7: Save (|ca
ε
i |, ca
ε
i , xaεi ) in S
′
8: end for
9: After finished all conjugations, sort S′ by the first element of every tuple
10: Copy the smallest M elements into S and delete the rest of S′
11: end while
12: Otherwise, output FAIL
4. Results
As a test of the resilience of polycyclic groups against the length-based attack,
Garber, Kahrobaei, and Lam [9] implemented four variants of the length-based
attack and performed experiments against all four variants. The conclusion was
that Algorithm 4, LBA with Memory 2, was the most effective. Hence, in this
study, we use Algorithm 4 for all of our experiments.
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We performed several sets of tests, all of which were run on an Intel Core I7
quad-core 2.0GHz computer with 12GB of RAM, running Ubuntu version 12.04
with GAP version 4.5 and 10GB of memory allowance. In all these tests, the
Heisenberg group G with 2n generators having Hirsch length h(G) = 2n + 1 is
generated using GAP with the Polycyclic group package [5]. The size of Alices and
Bobs public sets are both N1 = N2 = 20, the memory used is M = 1000 and the
time-out is 30 minutes.
To see the effect of element length, we fix the key length L = 10, but changes
the range of random element between [L1, L2] = [10, 13] and [20,23]. The result is
as follows:
n h(G) [L1, L2] = [10, 13] [L1, L2] = [20, 23]
5 11 29% 53%
6 13 69% 39%
7 15 51% 58%
8 17 62% 67%
As we can see, changing the length of random element does not have a dramatic
effect on the success rate. Hence, to ensure a lower rate of success, one should look
for other factors like the Hirsch length or the key length.
To see the effect of Hirsch length, we use a small key length L = 10 to increase the
possibility of success. The length of each random element is in [L1, L2] = [10, 13].
The result is as follows:
n h(G) Time Success rate
3 7 45.42 hours 11%
5 11 37.82 hours 29%
6 13 21.12 hours 69%
7 15 28.95 hours 51%
8 17 24.33 hours 62%
Curiously, the higher the Hirsch length in this case, the higher and quicker the
length-based attack succeeded. This interesting result warrant further investiga-
tions.
To illustrate the effect of key length, in the following experiment, we let the
length of each random element to be in [L1, L2] = [20, 23] and vary the key length
L.
n h(G) L=10 L=20 L=50
5 11 53% 11% 1%
6 13 39% 7% 0%
7 15 58% 5% 1%
8 17 67% 9% 7%
Clearly, increasing the key length reduced the success rate dramatically. What is
interesting is that the same algorithm, together with the same parameters, when
applied on polycyclic group of Hirsch length 10 generated with number field as in
[9] gave 0% success rate. However, it is clear that we need different parameters to
ensure low success rates.
We turn the key length to L = 50, let length of random element be [L1, L2] =
[40, 43]. Note that this is the parameters used in [20], which succeeded in breaking
AAG with braid group.
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n h(G) L=50
6 13 0%
7 15 0%
8 17 1%
As expected, this produces almost zero success rate. We recommend this as pa-
rameters for Heisenberg group as platform for AAG.
Finally, as a stress test, we increase the time-out to 4 hours instead of the usual
30 minutes per test. Because of the long time-out, we only do 50 tests each, instead
of 100 test batch as in the previous experiments. The element length is kept at
[L1, L2] = [20, 23], key length is L = 20.
n h(G) L=20
6 13 3%
7 15 4%
8 17 7%
Even at such long time-out, success rate is quite modest, given that the key length
we use here is quite small.
With these results, we conclude that the Heisenberg groups work well as platform
for the AAG protocol given the correct parameters. This strengthens the idea
to use polycyclic group as platform for AAG in particular, and non-commutative
cryptographic primitives in general.
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